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isherwood's impersonality: 
ascetic self-divestiture  
and queer relationality in  
a single man
Octavio R. Gonzalez
Christopher Isherwood's celebrated novel A Single Man portrays 
a gay man as an ordinary human being. For its time, the novel's de-
piction of homosexuality as a legitimate minoritarian identity, rather 
than individual pathology, was a radical political gesture. Given this 
context, literary critics see the novel as anticipating gay liberation. 
Claude Summers, for instance, declares, "the minority conscious-
ness of homosexuals and their oppression are crucial themes of A 
Single Man" (xiii).1 The critical commonplace shows acceptance of 
the novel's incontrovertible identity politics: A Single Man champions 
an ordinary gay man as synecdoche for a burgeoning homosexual 
community, a political minority consciousness. Yet, as my argument 
will demonstrate, A Single Man endorses an ascetic ethos of queer 
impersonality, which pervades the majority of the novel's scenes 
of sociability and attachment. That impersonal asceticism severely 
qualifies the notion that A Single Man celebrates identity politics as 
the primary strategic weapon of literary-cultural gay activism. More 
broadly, my argument is that Isherwood's ethos of impersonality is 
evident in a broader conception of the Isherwood archive, from Berlin 
Stories to My Guru and His Disciple. The Berlin Stories are celebrated 
for their aesthetic of impersonal detachment, Isherwood's eponymous 
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narrator exemplifying Georg Simmel's figure of "the stranger."2 In the 
wake of gay liberation and the Stonewall Era, however, critics and 
Isherwood both have reframed his career as a gradual coming-out 
process after his expatriation to the US in 1939. The American Ish-
erwood, to borrow James Berg's phrase, became a staunch advocate 
of gay rights. Isherwood's later writings depict homosexual themes 
and scenes openly, which makes Isherwood's 1930s writings seem 
quaintly closeted by comparison. At least this is the dominant critical 
view of the Isherwood archive.
I do not dispute that Isherwood evolved into an outspoken 
author on behalf of what he himself called the gay male tribe.3 His 
Christopher and His Kind recapitulates the Berlin years in autobio-
graphical form, with the agenda of disclosing what had been veiled 
before. Isherwood, no less than his gay critics, viewed his pre-War 
writings as self-censored. For instance, on the first page of Christopher 
and His Kind, the author regards his Lions and Shadows as being "not 
truly autobiographical . . . The author conceals important facts about 
himself." This is a damning judgment considering that Isherwood's 
memoir is dedicated to divulging the secrets of his Berlin years, start-
ing with the reason he expatriated to Berlin. Isherwood adds, "when 
Lions and Shadows suggests that Christopher's chief motive for going 
to Berlin was that he wanted to meet [anthropologist John] Layard, 
it is avoiding the truth" (2). That truth was that "Christopher was 
then unwilling to discuss [the] sexual significance" (3) of his move 
to Berlin—namely, that "Berlin meant Boys" (2). Isherwood, thus, 
famously critiques his own pre-War writings as "too much fiction and 
too little frankness" (3). His post-Stonewall memoir is framed as the 
belated account of his sexual liberation. The American Isherwood 
seems fully dedicated to the supposed frankness of autobiography. 
But the standard readings of Isherwood fall victim to the no-
tion, critiqued by Michel Foucault, that the truth of the self is a sexual 
truth—a tendency still rampant in accounts of the 1960s, an era de-
fined in hindsight by the cultural logic of gay liberation and the sexual 
revolution. Perhaps coincidentally, the original French edition of The 
History of Sexuality and Christopher and His Kind came out in the 
same year, occupying seemingly opposite poles in the cultural politics 
of gay liberation. Foucault's is a demystification of the abiding truth-
claims of sexual (including homosexual) cultural politics, whereas 
Isherwood's is a qualified deployment of this very logic of identity. 
I take Christopher and His Kind to be a qualified deployment of 
the visibility discourse of gay liberation because, given Isherwood's 
artistic investment in impersonality as a modernist aesthetic doctrine, 
his use of memoir in the latter stages of his career is in tension with 
this doctrine.4 So even as Christopher and His Kind is dedicated to 
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divulging the sexual secrets of the Berlin years in an ideological 
deployment of Isherwood's gay politics, Isherwood's sensibility of 
impersonality and self-divestiture is legible in this memoir as well, 
though less so than in his more self-vaporizing fictional narratives 
such as A Single Man, as we will see below. Isherwood subscribed to 
a distinction between the aesthetic orders of fiction and nonfiction, 
legible in his phrase "too much fiction and too little frankness" to 
describe the earlier novels and memoirs. Even so, Christopher and 
His Kind maintains formal if not political allegiance to Isherwood's 
aesthetic doctrine of impersonality, a modernist principle that is a 
permanent feature of his oeuvre.5 
Given this introduction, the argument that follows revises the 
dominant Isherwood narrative. Rather than read A Single Man as 
laying the groundwork for his autobiographical 1960s writings,6 
which embrace homosexuals as a legitimate minority, I argue for 
Isherwood's aesthetic commitment to an ascetic ideal of imperson-
ality, a queer ideal in a non-identitarian sense. The novel privileges 
this ideal with a governing thematic of the divestment of posses-
sive personhood, in terms of collective or personal interest. With 
the aid of the anti-identitarian theoretical frameworks of Tim Dean, 
Leo Bersani, and Lauren Berlant, I read A Single Man as projecting 
an impersonal queer ethos. For my purposes, Bersani encapsulates 
this mode of queer impersonality as the "ascesis of an ego-divesting 
discipline" (Intimacies 35). Impersonal asceticism involves the urge 
to suspend or violate the self's personal integrity, to transcend the 
self, even evacuate personality, through means such as ritual. Such 
rituals can be as simple as performative displays of self-abnegation 
as we will see in A Single Man, which stages scenes that serve the 
protagonist's desire for negative self-transcendence in the service of 
an impersonal ascetic ideal. 
My main contention is that A Single Man champions an imper-
sonal queer ascesis, narratively staged in scenes depicting George, 
the protagonist, engaged in self-abnegating gestures. Thus, the novel 
represents Isherwood's impersonal ascetic ideal and queer ethics of 
relationality. One form of ascetic escape from the self is disidentifica-
tion from cultural (or subcultural) identity. Another register of queer 
impersonality is the escape from the personal, as opposed to the 
cultural, self. The boundary between the two, of course, is not at all 
clear: the personal and the political bleed into each other, especially 
in a novel that foregrounds the importance of minority social identity. 
My argument isolates four main thematic representations of ascetic 
self-divestiture and queer impersonality in the novel, which also tend 
to bleed into one another: (1) what I am calling detached attach-
ment to others, often mediated by negative affects, such as envy 
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or hate; (2) performativity and role-playing; (3) political disidenti-
fication from one's prescribed social identity; and (4) self-inflicted 
injury. Ultimately, the significance of A Single Man's valorization of 
ascetic self-divestiture and queer impersonality, in scenes that divest 
the ego of significance, lies in transcending the normative claims of 
the personal and the political. Such a queer impersonal aesthetic is 
ideologically inconsistent with the (albeit qualified) project of gay 
visibility in Christopher and His Kind. 
In this sense, Isherwood's novel is more queer than gay; George 
may represent a single gay man, but the novel's ascetic ideal and 
ethos of queer impersonality argues against reading the narrative as 
a cultural instrument for gay identitarian representation. Indeed, at 
the basic, formal level, Isherwood's aesthetic of queer impersonality 
is evident in his consistent use of an external third-person narrator 
even in his nonfiction. The impersonal ascetic ideal argues against 
possessive investment in a political homosexual identity. Indeed, 
I argue that the ascetic impersonality in A Single Man is in direct 
tension with the novel's representation of gay identity as a minority 
consciousness. 
By contrast, the asceticism and queer forms of detached attach-
ment depicted in A Single Man articulate an alternative or "misfit" 
vision of minority subjectivity: the novel calls George and others of 
his kind "nonconformists." This vision clearly departs from the novel's 
farcical presentation of George's rage as a grotesquely violent passion 
keyed in his consciousness as a gay "minority-sister," in the novel's 
famous formulation. The novel instead stages principled departures 
from the political narrative of possessive personhood, as well as 
other liberal tenets of tolerance and equality, in favor of envisioning 
a queer ethos of ascetic impersonality.7 
Isherwood's relationship to queer history is a vexed one. Pace 
his own increasingly vocal advocacy in the 1960s, it would behoove 
us to analyze the fiction to glean Isherwood's concerted stance to-
ward the aesthetic politics of gay liberation. Here, generic distinctions 
are decisive. Isherwood's derogation of Lions and Shadows (and 
Berlin Stories) as "too much fiction and too little frankness" lays 
bare his modernist aesthetic of queer impersonality. Isherwood's 
fiction adheres to an aesthetic doctrine defined by an ethos of queer 
impersonality and a self-dissolving ascetic ideal, both reflective of 
Isherwood's minoritarian nonconformity with identity politics. This 
literary practice exemplifies the cultural concept I term the "misfit 
minority," even in the face of a paradigm shift in cultural politics with 
gay liberation. In an important sense, Isherwood's late-career turn to 
autobiography and nonfiction memoir is explained by his modernist 
autotelic doctrine of fictional representation. Art could never truly 
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function for Isherwood as propaganda, which is why he revisits Berlin 
not in fictional Stories, but in factual autobiography, in order to better 
effect a turn toward identity politics that his aesthetic approach to 
literary representation and his aesthetic of the ascetic ideal of queer 
impersonality did not allow. By Isherwood's own admission, Lions 
and Shadows fails the test of frankness of nonfictional autobiography 
that his later memoirs take up. Isherwood's novels follow this logic of 
generic distinction, which distances fiction from the claims of real-life 
factuality or frankness, which Isherwood maintains was properly the 
province of nonfictional autobiography.8 As noted, however, even in 
the mode of memoir, Isherwood formally maintains an impersonal 
remainder not subsumed under the aegis of pure political advocacy; 
his reliance on third-person narration even in the mode of political 
autobiography signals his continued skepticism toward the entail-
ments of identity even as he paradoxically mobilized impersonal form 
to advance a liberationist agenda.
The next section develops Bersani's concept of ascetic imper-
sonality and Berlant's notion of lateral agency in order to ground my 
argument regarding A Single Man's queer nonconformist or misfit-
minoritarian ethos of impersonality and ascetic self-divestiture. Then, 
I consider important moments from the novel that stage this ideal and 
practice. In the conclusion, I return to the issue of Isherwood's political 
investments in gay representation and misfit-minority consciousness, 
arguing that the theme of ascetic impersonality in A Single Man helps 
us reconceive Isherwood's oeuvre as developing an aesthetic politics 
of principled detachment from personal and collective projects. 
Ultimately, I am arguing for a broader recuperation of Isher-
wood's pre-Stonewall queer poetics and politics, including the use of 
the impersonal Berlin narrator, denigrated as "sexless" by Edmund 
White (2), among others. Rather than read Isherwood's long career 
as divided thematically by the event of Stonewall, as many critics 
do, I maintain that his modernist aesthetic practice values queer 
impersonality and ascetic self-divestiture and that his literary posi-
tioning does not ultimately conform to the claims of identity politics 
in the Stonewall narrative of modern gay liberation. His outspoken 
advocacy as an author on behalf of gay rights must not overshadow 
his literary valorization of ascetic impersonality and nonconformist 
queer consciousness. A Single Man projects a political spirituality 
invested and divested of possessive personhood and what poet 
Reginald Shepherd calls the "prescriptive and restrictive" burdens of 
minority identity (11). Indeed, Isherwood protected his fiction from 
devolving into "political propaganda," to borrow the vocabulary of his 
time. Throughout his career, Isherwood sustained an early developed 
identification with the modernist ideal of the autonomy of art.9 This 
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aesthetic ideal, I argue, explains his 1960s turn away from literary 
fiction to nonfiction autobiography: his embrace of gay liberation 
entailed a different genre of writing practice. His fictional works, I 
believe, remain ambivalent about the claims of homosexuality as a 
political identity. 
My argument thus finds continuity between pre- and post-
Stonewall Isherwood, whereas most critics find a break in his turn 
toward American-style identity politics in his self-representation as an 
engaged, gay author.10 The Isherwood of the earlier fictional works, 
in short, is more queer than gay. It is only if we measure Isherwood 
according to the dictates of our own contemporary frame of Stone-
wall that his pre-1970s works seem closeted by comparison. I think 
we should celebrate the impersonal Berlin Stories and Isherwood's 
ego-attenuating and impersonal queerness, an oblique mode of queer 
intersubjectivity represented in early and later novels alike.
Ascetic Self-Divestiture and Lateral Agency
Leo Bersani's Intimacies names a form of self-attenuation that 
we might find articulated in A Single Man.11 Bersani locates the cultural 
practice of ascetic self-divestiture in a particular form of seventeenth-
century mysticism, a practice of radical submission to an impersonal 
divine being that invades and annihilates the self. Isherwood's novel 
exemplifies this form of self-annihilating impersonality.12 In a sense, 
the opposite of self-divestiture that Bersani—and, I argue, Isher-
wood—represent is the conventional conception of identity. In the 
same chapter in which he elaborates the impersonal ascetic ideal, 
Bersani recapitulates his notion of self-shattering in relation to sexual 
jouissance.13 In Intimacies, he touches on the "at once violently ag-
gressive and self-shattering ego-hyperbolizing of racial, national, 
ethnic, and gendered identities" (55). This phrase implies that mi-
noritarian social identity is consolidated at the expense of openness 
to the other.14 By contrast, Bersani analyzes the mystics' surrender 
to an inhuman or anonymous other, to whom one grants affective, 
cognitive, and perhaps sexual access, to the point of self-erasure. 
Bersani's "pure love" (51) mystics exemplify the self-shattering em-
brace of alterity. These ascetics represent the opposite of normative 
self-mastery or what one might call executive personhood.
Lauren Berlant's concept of lateral agency, too, is helpful here. 
Berlant's lateral agent shrinks from the sovereign mode of subjectiv-
ity; the latter is linked to the self-obsessed power wielded by Bersani's 
"ego-hyperbolizing" subject. Berlant cites as an ordinary example of 
sovereign subjectivity the impulse to go to the gym. The subject's 
investment in futurity and development—bettering one's physical form 
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by regular exercise—is an effective strategy or a strategy of being 
effective. This example illustrates what psychologist Roy Baumeister 
terms "high-level self-awareness"—of oneself as the subject of bil-
dung, the teleological—or theological—self (29). This self depends on 
a timocratic notion of personhood in our society, in Orlando Patterson's 
terms—a self-mythologizing leader of men. Sovereign personhood, 
and its extension as sovereign agency, is anathema to self-divesting 
subjects, among which my interest is in misfit minorities, who remain 
lateral. They remain at the margins of scenes of collective triumph, 
even minoritarian collectives. The lateral agent, in contrast to gym-
frequenting overachiever, habitually skips the gym: this shift in 
self-elaboration entails spreading out, rather than moving forward. 
According to Berlant, lateral self-management occurs when people 
stop trying to build personal monuments to themselves. In these 
moments of lateral, as opposed to vertical, self-extension, the sub-
ject thinks in terms of inertia, impasse, and immediate if ephemeral 
satisfaction. In some ways, "thinking" is the wrong term for these 
self-suspending scenes of inhabiting oneself without building one's 
life as a narrative of development. Sovereign subjects negotiate what 
Baumeister calls the "burden of selfhood" (29); the ascetic subject 
spreads himself laterally to escape this burden in what Berlant calls 
"small vacations from the will" ("Slow Death" 779).15
Berlant's concept of the lateral agent seems, on the surface, to 
have little to do with what counts as agency proper. Socially symbolic 
forms of action—such as being thin, wearing shoes that match, and 
other ordinary practices of self-management—represent a burden 
that individuals sometimes put aside. Certain individuals adopt lateral 
moves rather than vertical trajectories of self-extension, remaining 
stuck, in Berlant's terms. Her social phenomenology seeks to articu-
late the many ways in which individuals are engaged in nonsovereign 
forms of being themselves, of being ordinary, of lacking "effective" 
agency, thereby evincing "desires not to be an inflated ego deploying 
and manifesting power" ("Slow Death" 757). 
Bersani and Berlant share the sense that alternative modes of 
living entail an aesthetics of existence as well as a queer ethics of 
relationality. My interest in this critical framework is how it illuminates 
minoritarian negotiations with double exile, or the double burden of 
normative personhood and minoritarian uplift. In ordinary habits of 
impersonal self-suspension, these lateral investments represent a 
queer way of being in the world. Rather than centering oneself on 
personal interest, the lateral agent, or Bersani's impersonal ascetic, 
looks to self-divestiture as a means of acceding to otherness—includ-
ing the otherness within—and inhabiting the world in a nonnormative 
or queer ethical relation. The forms of political possibility that such 
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anti-imperial self-elaboration allow is a key question for me and for 
Bersani and Berlant, who valorize queerness not as an identity free 
from the constraints of power, but as an impersonal mode of rela-
tionality and self-declension that dissipates rather than consolidates 
authority over others and mastery over the self.
As the following examples in A Single Man illustrate, Isher-
wood's aesthetic is devoted to an impersonal ascetic ideal and a 
queer ethics without reducing queerness to sexual identity. The novel 
dramatizes and epitomizes a misfit-minority mode of subjectivity—
chiefly its protagonist's—in scenes of impersonal negotiation and 
self-abnegation. These scenes suggest that A Single Man should not 
be filtered through a retrofitted lens of gay liberation, at least not 
primarily. Rather, the novel explores queer impersonality through 
the suspension of self-possessive personality and political identity in 
decidedly unheroic ways.
"I am with you, little minority-sister":  
Pedagogy of the Oppressed
The central instance representing the minority consciousness 
of A Single Man occurs during George's turn at the podium in the 
lecture hall, when he discusses Aldous Huxley's After Many a Summer 
Dies the Swan. The classroom scene turns on George's impassioned 
critique of "pseudoliberal sentimentality" (71). More specifically, 
the discussion is sparked by a question raised by Huxley's novel. A 
student asks whether Huxley was an anti-Semite for declaring the 
stupidity of the biblical text, "they hated me without cause" (69). 
This is a central theme in the novel: Multiculturalism in Los Angeles 
and the relationship between minorities and the hegemony of liberal 
thought in the US during the Cold War. Isherwood's novella identi-
fies this American political consensus with George's neighbors, Mr. 
and Mrs. Strunk, who function as the personification of this "blandly 
annihilating" liberal majority: "Mrs. Strunk . . . is trained in the new 
tolerance, the technique of annihilation by blandness" (27). The 
Strunks represent liberal tolerance toward minorities, a political cat-
egory that in Isherwood's novel clearly includes homosexuals. Such 
tolerance, however, as we will see from George's lecture, is a form 
of domesticating the strangeness—or otherness—that minoritarian 
subjects represent. So, while integration into the polity is a chief 
political goal, such integration carries its risk: Isherwood knew this 
as a lifelong thinker regarding the challenges that cultural identity 
posed to large-scale political systems such as democratic liberalism 
in Britain and the Communisms and fascisms of an earlier era.16
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The classroom scene foregrounds George's perspective that 
social exchanges are never between, say, absolutely privileged and 
absolutely disenfranchised subjects. Rather, the narrative presents, 
in principle, the social contingency and relativity of power. Particularly 
in this scene, the novel notes how power and resistance operate on 
a sliding scale and vary by context. A privileged British accent helps 
George deal with a world from which he feels excluded, for instance. 
The novel's discourse shows how relatively privileged and less privi-
leged individuals make use of, or even exploit, the sociocultural as-
sets at their disposal. 
A Single Man's treatment of the relative nature of class and other 
institutionalized forms of privilege rejects liberal pressure to ignore 
social differences in the name of equality. Since the novel implies 
that paying lip service to equality is a way of avoiding the reality of 
oppression and resistance, George argues against this facile solution:
Minorities are people—people, not angels. Sure, they're 
like us—but not exactly like us. . . . It's better if we admit 
to disliking and hating them than if we try to smear our 
feelings over with pseudo-liberal sentimentality. If we're 
frank about our feelings, we have a safety valve; and if 
we have a safety valve, we're actually less likely to start 
persecuting. (71)
The heart of the scene rests in disputing the liberal notion that ma-
jorities persecute the other without cause and, relatedly, that mi-
noritarian subjects are paragons of virtue ("angels"), innocent of all 
hate. By contrast, George lectures his students that there is always 
a cause for hate. He asserts that the cause for hate is the majority's 
perception of the other as a threat, even if this hate is imaginary and 
without merit, regardless of what liberal sentimentality says. George 
describes a world where hate begets hate and aggression begets 
aggression—no matter how imaginary the causes for the hatred of 
the other, the hatred exists, and those so disenfranchised by power 
react in kind with their "own kind of aggression": 
A minority has its own kind of aggression. It absolutely 
dares the majority to attack it. It hates the majority—not 
without a cause, I grant you. It even hates the other mi-
norities, because all minorities are in competition: each one 
proclaims that its sufferings are the worst and its wrongs 
the blackest. And the more they all hate, and the more 
they're all persecuted, the nastier they become! (72)
This passage resonates as an implicit explanation of George's own 
hate of the "Mr. [and Mrs.] Strunks of the world" and, by synecdo-
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che, of heteronormative society. The novel spends a great deal of 
time—especially in the driving scene that shortly precedes George's 
classroom tirade—describing George's rage and detailing his mur-
derous fantasies as Uncle George, in which he effects a large-scale 
campaign of terror on the civilized world.
Putting aside the politically untenable posture that George as-
sumes in this rant,17 George's tirade represents a powerful if silent 
advocacy for homosexuality as a protected minority, akin to Jewish-
ness. His lecture articulates the political desire to end the persecution 
of others by allowing democratic subjects to speak the "unspeak-
able," which is George's term for negative affects repressed by the 
norms of "pseudoliberal sentimentality." Such a belief in speaking 
truth to power—confess your sins and you shall be free—follows a 
1960s cultural logic against repression. This logic, in the form of the 
so-called repressive hypothesis, was Foucault's principal target in 
the first volume of The History of Sexuality. Unenlightened by this 
Foucauldian critique, George expounds the cultural belief that re-
leasing one's social prejudices and blindspots creates, in his terms, 
a social "safety valve" that dissipates the hate and aggression that 
we all share. More importantly, George argues that voicing prevailing 
negative attitudes toward the other prevents the eventual return of 
the majority's aggression in the political form of persecution ("if we 
have a safety valve, we're actually less likely to start persecuting"). 
This line of thinking is a utopian wish for political rapprochement 
across all classes of social and political division following from ago-
nistic democratic dialogue.
And this radical principle of liberatory de-repression, in Herbert 
Marcuse's terms, is what Foucault attacks as misguided. George im-
parts this notion of liberation through unfettered personal expression 
to his students, culminating in a wish-fulfillment fantasy. Expound-
ing on the irreducible distinctions that divide the social body—what 
we would call the nature of identity and difference—George voices 
the dated and facile example of the difference between "a Negro 
and a Swede" (71). At once, he regrets his choice. The narrator 
records George asking himself in interior monologue, "Why, oh why 
daren't George say 'between Estelle Oxford and Buddy Sorensen?'" 
(71). Estelle and Buddy are two of his students, then present in the 
classroom. George wonders whether "if he did dare" to use student 
names, instead of using impersonal identity categories, "there would 
be a great atomic blast of laughter, and everybody would embrace, 
and the kingdom of heaven would begin, right here in classroom 278. 
But then again, maybe it wouldn't" (71). Here we see how George's 
diatribe against liberal repression of cultural difference expresses 
a utopian wish for transcending these differences, which divide his 
students and the social body as a whole. 
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But George is not so un-Foucauldian as it might appear. He also 
deflates such a wistful fantasy, admitting how far-fetched such an 
outcome would be. Despite his utopian motivation, in other words, 
George does not believe entirely in the efficacy of his own fantasy 
of liberation, of transcending hierarchical social differences through 
democratic dialogue and free expression. Rather, George's utopia-
nism is balanced by his curmudgeonly anti-sentimentality, his refusal 
to romanticize the oppressed, or even oppression. Such a position 
runs the risk of political relativism ("all minorities are in competition: 
each one proclaims that its sufferings are the worst"). But George 
seeks to shock his students out of their complacency—their own 
pseudoliberal biases—and thus allows himself the role of gadfly. He 
takes up the modernist injunction to épater le bourgeois, typical of 
a character drawn from another era—the era that Huxley and Ish-
erwood knew first hand. George's students believe in the fantasy of 
liberation through the absence of discourse, the refusal to accept the 
darker emotions and motives of even benighted groups. His frank-
ness in admitting negative emotions, especially that of aggression 
("every minority has its own aggression"), reflects George's own 
aggressive impulses, as noted in his murderous fantasies. A Single 
Man thus represents the aggression of a minoritarian subject, such 
as George's "murderous rage," even prior to the recognition of the 
political legitimacy of this rage: the radicalized homosexual, before 
the moment of Stonewall and modern gay liberation, itself a violent 
uprising against political repression. In this sense Isherwood's novel 
functions as a cultural weapon against American society's oppression 
of homosexuals, especially during the Cold War. Dignifying the political 
anger of George's murderous Uncle George fantasies, as we will see 
below, the classroom lecture is a pedagogy of the oppressed to the 
complacent majority, a counterpoint to the queer ethics of ascetic 
impersonality that the novel represents. 
Given this scene, therefore, it is curious how the majority of the 
novel champions a self-effacing mode of minoritarian subjectivity, a 
misfit or nonconformist style of being distinguished by ascetic self-
suspension and impersonal intersubjectivity. Rather than celebrating 
the minoritarian subject's clamoring for representation and recogni-
tion, the novel usually clamors to show an alternative poetics and 
politics of the minority subject. This alternative queer model has been 
illegible to Isherwood's critics as a form of agency, a mode of political 
subjectivity. Yet, the classroom scene prepares us for the "aggression 
of the minority," and I argue that these scenes demonstrate just what 
such aggression, and other affects, signify in a narrative economy 
that privileges the impersonal ethos and pathos of a self-diminishing 
minoritarian subject. 
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Rather than assuming the sovereign mode of subjectivity that 
George personifies in the classroom scene, he more frequently acts as 
a self-effacing protagonist, engaging figures to whom he is attached 
impersonally—his student Kenny, or Doris, his deceased partner's 
former lover. This alternative ethics of living in self-suspension, in 
modes counter to aggression and hate and other affects of political 
extension, informs Isherwood's queer impersonal sensibility. This sen-
sibility is pre-Stonewall and far from the recognizable political modes 
of sovereign subjectivity. This is what I consider the novel's aesthetic 
political agenda—its imagining of an alternative or nonconformist 
mode of minoritarian subjectivity, marked by affects and postures that 
embrace impersonal detachment and ascetic self-abstention rather 
than normative filiation and self-interest. A Single Man endorses a 
self-diminishing, impersonal mode of being minoritarian or being 
doubly "minor," a mode far from the triumphs of Stonewall and the 
retroactive will-to-power of gay liberation. 
Queer Ascetic Impersonality 
I now turn to A Single Man more systematically to analyze key 
scenes that project the ego-divesting ideal of impersonality that is 
signally oriented to an ethics of queer relationality.The following 
scenes track the novel's development of queer impersonality and 
ascetic self-divestiture as a misfit-minoritarian theory and practice. 
The classroom scene, which precedes the others, laid the theoretical 
groundwork in touching on the inescapable tensions haunting the 
social field: the inequities of minority and majority. George's lecture 
articulates the ordinary realities of social difference and political mar-
ginalization and gestures toward a way of reconceiving minoritarian 
subjectivity, thereby engaging with this political reality in an alterna-
tive fashion. The lecture scene also employs the persistent theme 
of social existence as a series of performances, or as performative 
being—a theme introduced in the very first passage of the novel. 
Isherwood's protagonist argues against what he terms "pseudoliberal 
sentimentality" (71) and what such an ideology of idealizing minorities 
entails for the multicultural world of Cold War Los Angeles. In short, 
George lectures his students regarding the negative affects and the 
historical intransigence of social conflict based on structural inequality. 
George's classroom lecture thus prepares the reader for the fol-
lowing scenes, which put the theory of social marginality into practice. 
At the intersubjective level, this theme highlights how social position 
haunts interpersonal relations and thereby depicts ascetic imper-
sonality as an ideal practice of ethical exchange. These depictions 
illustrate how the personal impinges on the social, how performativity 
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and negative affects provide a model for impersonal attachments, 
and how to practice impersonal performativity and self-effacement 
in moments of recognition and reconciliation of social differences. 
Yet, beyond the interpersonal domain, lies the political and 
cultural significance of the homosexual as victim of heteronormativ-
ity, or what George at another moment calls "the American utopia, 
the kingdom of the good life upon earth" (126). This is a "kingdom" 
"co-owned" by his banal neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Strunk. George 
bitterly reflects how they "are proud of their kingdom," one that 
he feels excludes him (126). In consonance with the minoritarian 
valence of A Single Man that critics focus on, the novel thus depicts 
moments that register George's cultural-political rage. At one point, 
George entertains a political fantasy of becoming a homicidal "Uncle 
George" in response to the fact that a "local newspaper editor has 
started a campaign against sex deviates" (36). George's political 
rage is directed at his editor, his neighbors, and the heteronorma-
tive "three-quarters of the world" (40) that, symbolically, took Jim 
away from him. Notable for its hyperbolic—or, following Bersani, its 
"ego-hyperbolizing"—aspect, George's sadistic revenge fantasy (to 
"launch a campaign of systematic terror" [38], in his words) is directed 
against individuals who represent the dominant power structures in 
society, such as a US senator: "His wife may be kidnapped, garroted, 
embalmed and sealed in the living room to await his return from the 
office. His children's heads may arrive in cartons in the mail" (39). 
In Bersani's terms, this mode of identity politics is keyed to hyper 
self-extension. George admits that his rage stems from a belief that 
"All are, in the last analysis, responsible for Jim's death; their words, 
their thoughts, their whole way of life willed it, even though they 
never knew he existed" (40; emphasis added). Such powerful repre-
sentations of George's "minority consciousness" extend an expansive 
sense of cultural politics ("their whole way of life") into the personal 
arena in ways that we can appreciate as militant; these moments 
allow Isherwood's critics to identify the novel with a straightforward 
politics of gay liberation. 
Yet, in contrast, the novel gives us disciplined abdications of 
sovereign self-interest. Such an escape registers the queer subject's 
ambivalence toward fighting for a collective cause, ambivalence 
toward the "Uncle George" register of minoritarian political repre-
sentation. It is important, therefore, to recognize the impersonal 
narrator's self-parodying tone as he ventriloquizes the Uncle George 
fantasy. In such a fantasy, the narrator ironically notes, "Jim hardly 
matters anymore. Jim is nothing now but an excuse for hating three 
quarters of the population of America" (40). The narrator continues: 
"What is George's hate, then? A stimulant, nothing more. . . . Rage, 
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resentment" (40). The free indirect style undercuts George's incen-
diary homosexual "rage [and] resentment." Now the rage is "but an 
excuse" and this "hate" "nothing more" than a testament to George's 
"middle age," an impersonal affect mobilized as political passion. The 
"middle age" qualifier ("nothing more") ironizes George's passionate 
political identity, undercutting its politically murderous seriousness.18 
I am much more interested in the novel's ordinary moments 
of escape from self-aggrandizing identitarian political claims and 
entailments, the latter of which surface in the semi-parodic "Uncle 
George" fantasy. More common than such hyperbolic fantasies that 
align pink-baiting newspaper editors and red-baiting US senators with 
modern totalitarian regimes such as the Khmer Rouge are moments 
such as George's self-effacing refusal to go to Jim's funeral, despite 
being invited by the latter's family. Such resistance conveys George's 
discipline of self-diminution: his queer, antisocial (and anti-familial) 
rejection of inclusion in the "sacred family grief," as the novel sar-
castically puts it (126). Indeed, George usually chooses the opposite 
of sovereign self-extension. He refuses the normative response, 
which would be to defend his self-interest, indeed his self-respect. 
George also enacts narcissistic self-injury and abdicates the burden 
of representation that defending the honor of his homosexual iden-
tity would entail. The novel thus champions an alternative or misfit 
minoritarian ideal, distinguished by an ethos of queer impersonality 
and ascetic self-abnegation, contrary to contemporary social norms 
that champion self-interest and the reification of identity. 
"[R]age without resentment," "abuse without venom"
At the Starboard Side, the bar that George visits later in the 
novel and the place where George first set eyes on Jim, he overhears 
an old couple arguing drunkenly. The narrator calls their exchange 
"rage without resentment," "abuse without venom" (150). Echoing 
George's grammar of impersonality and negative affects, the novel 
here combines self-contradicting concepts. What is rage without 
resentment or abuse without venom if not an ascetic practice of im-
personal intimacy? The performative function of these roles is what 
renders the rage free of resentment and the abuse devoid of venom. 
In this scene, the novel continues to depict a paradoxical practice of 
impersonal attachment—here based on performativity and distancing 
entailed in the use of roleplay—one that is laced with negative af-
fects and erotic desire. From George's increasingly inebriated, limited 
point of view, the narrator describes an older couple rehearsing the 
vibrant impersonal script of their romance as "two nonconformists" 
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practicing their way of love: a mild quarrelsome alcohol-
ism which makes it possible for them to live in a play-
relationship, like children. You old bag, you old prick, you 
old bitch, you old bastard: rage without resentment, abuse 
without venom. This is how it will be for them till the end. 
Let's hope they will never be parted, but die in the same 
hour of the same night, in their beer-stained bed. (149–50)
This perversely romantic description might bring tears to a reader's 
eyes. But said reader would have to be a misfit herself, a nonconform-
ist "unhypnotized" by the norms of pseudoliberal sentimentality (149). 
These social norms, like the "pseudoliberal" norms of political dis-
course, eschew negative intensities because they seem "abusive" and 
"resentful." But these intensities are, instead, performative utterances 
cementing a "play-relationship" that constitutes a paradoxical practice 
of love. To the conformist reader who adheres to strictly affirming 
models of self-sovereignty and reciprocal relationality, especially the 
romantic kind, there is no such thing as abuse without venom, rage 
without resentment. For such conformists, allowing self-diminishment, 
in a scene embracing insult and self-injury, is anathema to the very 
idea of interpersonal romance. Here, a queer ethics of impersonality 
triumphs—note the lack of proper names, and the lack of normative 
forms of expressing love—which paradoxically enables the couple to 
continue their romance into middle age and beyond.
This scene epitomizes Isherwood's skewering of the "sacrosanct 
value of selfhood," a fundamental value of liberal society. Yet, this 
is a value, according to Bersani's formulation, that "may account for 
human beings' extraordinary willingness to kill in order to protect 
the seriousness of their statements" (Culture of Redemption 4). This 
couple's performative interaction underscores the novel's investments 
in minimizing the "sacrosanct value of selfhood," here dramatized 
in a self-conscious "play-relationship." Indeed, George's murder-
ous revenge fantasy stands in parodic contrast to the impersonal 
negativity that mediates the couple's interaction; their rage has no 
resentment, their abuse no venom. Here, A Single Man makes a case 
for the importance of such perverse affective relations, which value 
the discomfiture of impersonal intimacy and abdicate the burden of 
defending the self against real or perceived narcissistic injury. Indeed, 
this scene perversely delights in a playful, sadomasochistic exchange 
of insults and equates it with a durable form of intimacy. 
As we see below, A Single Man stages various scenes of dynamic 
resistance to pseudoliberal sentimentality, to normative models of 
individuals as sacrosanct entities, and to relationships solely based 
on liberal tolerance, affirmation, and equality. This resistance is based 
on the novel's argument that such sentimental norms simply hide the 
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truths of a social reality composed of violence, aggression, injustice, 
and inequality. Moreover, the novel's critique of what it terms pseu-
doliberal sentimentality is due to its implicit claim that hypocritical 
disavowal of such reality serves only to perpetuate that very same 
status quo. To engage with the terms of this status quo is a form of 
truth-telling of an impersonal sort.
As a detached observer, George here seems to champion an 
impersonal model of romance personified by this couple from a bygone 
era—they belong to the first colonists who founded the picturesque 
seaside town George lives in. And this model of romance is beyond 
Freud's pleasure principle, for the scene represents an alternative, 
drawn from the combination of both erotic and aggressive forces that 
underlie a marriage as well as other intimate relations. This reality 
suggests that impersonal intimacy dramatized in a sadomasochistic 
"play-relationship" can sustain, instead of threaten, a lifelong mar-
riage and even allow the spouses to maintain a "childlike" innocence 
beyond middle age. Even alcoholism ("mild quarrelsome alcoholism"; 
"beer-stained bed") is valorized in this impersonal attachment, this 
mutual, performative abnegation of personal sanctity. Their bad 
romance runs counter to a sentimental vision of social hygiene that 
disavows the possibility of a "beer-stained bed" without alcohol-
ism—eschewing the stigma of addiction—or of lovers projecting rage 
without resentment or abuse without venom.
"Because the dialogue is by its nature impersonal"
Perhaps the most important scene of impersonal ascetic rela-
tionality involves Kenny Potter's entry into George's drunken world. 
This moment dedicates itself quite openly to a celebration of the 
value of a queer impersonal dynamic sustaining a self-abnegating, 
detached intimacy. The tenor of George and Kenny's exchange is 
pining for a bygone era when, in Kenny's words, "you could call your 
father sir" (159). In the discourse of the novel, such a desire reads 
as the longing for a formal mode of attachment. George recognizes 
Kenny's desire for a hierarchical structure between them, given their 
respective power imbalance and age difference. After Kenny longs to 
be living in a time "when you could call your father sir," George warns 
Kenny that he will soon forget this. Kenny submissively agrees: "Well 
if you say so—okay." George: "Okay, sir." Kenny: "Okay, sir!" Kenny 
"beams" with "pleasure" (159). Such dialogue entails a mode of re-
lating between impersonal, formally hierarchical categories of social 
identity, such as, in the case of Kenny and George, "Youth" versus 
"Age" (154). The novel implicitly advocates misfit or nonconformist 
social and affective intimacies that such hierarchical relations can 
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afford for both minority and, perhaps, majority subject positions. As 
with the practice of nonconformist intimacy expressed as rage without 
resentment, here we have another form of self-dispossession that 
constitutes libidinal, yet formal, ethical contact. 
The novel suggests that there is a salutary function in an ethos of 
embracing social polarization in order to achieve impersonal intimacy, 
a form unavailable to politically over-determined modes of exchange. 
George notes that in this type of "symbolic dialogue," "what really 
matters is not what you talk about, but the being together in this 
particular relationship" (154). The content of the conversation is not 
as important as the formal relationship being forged—one that lets 
interlocutors "talk about anything and change the subject as often 
as [they] like" (154). Implicit in this line of thinking is the fact that 
seldom do individuals stratified and polarized by social hierarchies 
engage in dialogue at all, so beholden are they to individual and col-
lective self-interests, especially vis-à-vis the burdens of sustaining 
them in the face of the other. 
George advocates this queer paradigm of impersonal intimacy 
achieved through detached attachment, as we see in George's en-
gaged observation of the couple, and qualified de-individuation, 
which enables personal engagement with impersonal otherness. For 
instance, George insists that the symbolic dialogue only works if both 
"[y]ou and your dialogue-partner [are] somehow opposites" (154). 
This type of formal interaction is based on depersonalization (Kenny 
calls him "sir" rather than "George"). Suspending one's individuality 
thus fosters a queerly impersonal attachment, laced with erotic en-
ergy, as this scene makes clear. The novel's psycho-narration builds 
a defense of George's ascetic ideal of queer impersonality, which, in 
addition to entailing denial of individuality and self-investment, also 
entails unself-interested attachment to one's social (or "symbolic") 
identity. 
Why do the partners have to be opposites? the novel's narrator 
asks, focalizing George's interior monologue: "Because you have to be 
symbolic figures—like, in this case, Youth and Age. Why do you have 
to be symbolic? Because the dialogue is by its nature impersonal. . . . 
It doesn't involve either party personally" (155). At this moment in 
the novel, the doctrine of impersonality is rhetorically reinforced as 
precisely a doctrine of ascesis, or aesthetics of existence.19 George 
argues that one must rely on an impersonal relationship to one's own 
symbolic identity in order to dialogue across reciprocal yet polarized 
lines—here, generational, but also national. Ironically, the purpose 
is not to identify, but to disidentify: to see across the divide and not 
to reify that division, as with normatively minoritarian injunctions of 
self-advocacy and self-representation. The self is suspended in an 
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abstract or impersonal intimacy of polar opposites as dialogic equals—
an ethical experiment in impersonal intersubjectivity, in the name 
of an ascetic ideal of lateral self-extension through de-individuation. 
Such lateral ascesis momentarily suspends the burden of selfhood 
and its possessive political entailments. 
Among the queer desires George evinces in his intimacy with 
Kenny is the desire for impersonal mutuality, in which the self is 
depersonalized and divested, replaced by the ironic performance 
of a hierarchical role—as the nostalgia for "sir" makes clear. More 
importantly, such abstract encounters stage the desire to play with 
social identity in a drama of power exchange. As we have seen, 
George resists espousing the "pseudoliberal sentiment" of denying 
social differences in the name of civic equality. In fact, he perversely 
urges the opposite, the performative intensification of differences as 
a nonnormative or queer ethical principle for negotiating a salient in-
teraction. But this identification is nonpossessive and nonadversarial: 
or, in the novel's parlance, without resentment and without venom. 
The recognition is an effort to bridge across identitarian divisions, 
rather than to emphasize them as a political form of self-extension. 
The scene's sadomasochistic energy lends this queer relation an added 
frisson, which could be claimed as antithetical to a visibility ethos 
of gay liberation, as George flirts with his student, but they never 
openly address the erotic undertow of their exchanges.
This queer model of interpersonal discourse, as with the couple 
engaging in a paradoxical impersonal intimacy, depends on embracing 
socially determined identities as a performance, a (role) play, and 
not as one's self. That self is too personal to be of use in this meet-
ing of cultural personae. Developing an impersonal ascetic ideal of 
relationality suggests that playing with power differentials and sym-
bolic identities is one form of potentially transforming one's relation 
to oneself, as well as to the other, by performing a script as social 
actors embedded in a hierarchical social world. This queer ethical 
alternative contrasts a possessive form of political identification, one 
the novel satirizes in the genocidal fantasies of Uncle George.20 The 
novel stages George's misfit minoritarian subjectivity in impersonal 
encounters rich in affective and libidinal intensities.21
Conclusion: Ascetically, Impersonally Queer 
To be clear, I am not arguing that A Single Man anticipates 
and also proleptically critiques what we now understand to be the 
cultural logic of identity well before Stonewall and other triumphs of 
minoritarian collective actions and the at times violent transformations 
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of the 1960s and 1970s. My argument is that the novel represents 
Isherwood's considered and consistent alternative to the politics 
of identity, what I call a misfit-minority poetics of detachment and 
qualified resistance to grandiose self-possessive projects, an ascetic 
ideal of queer impersonality that is legible to us from our contempo-
rary vantage point. Ultimately, Isherwood resisted the call to write 
himself into what David Garnes terms the "pantheon of modern gay 
literature," if by "literature" we mean "fiction" (201). A Single Man 
conveys a contrary tendency away from prescriptive and restrictive 
claims of political identity, projecting instead a nonconformist mi-
noritarian model of ascesis, depicting modes of self-divestiture and 
what I consider Isherwood's quintessential queer ethos of impersonal 
attachment, which perhaps defines his contribution to Anglophone 
letters and queers everywhere. In this sense, to call Isherwood a 
proleptic advocate for an identitarian politics of gay visibility in A 
Single Man is to miss his proleptic aesthetic demurral from such 
prescriptive and restrictive models of relationality and subjectivity. 
Isherwood deconstructs the very subject he reconstructs, in a literary 
novel that is politically resonant in a contrary sense to the politics of 
gay identity he is most known for now. 
Isherwood's novel thus represents a particularly resonant, non-
conformist minoritarian subjectivity that survived two World Wars, 
expatriation and self-imposed exile, and the multicultural American 
century. From his wide experience with transnational homosexual 
politics in the 1930s, Isherwood wrote the modernist impersonality 
into A Single Man. These social and affective norms that the novel 
suspends serve as a now-familiar critique of what Eve Kosofsky 
Sedwick called our own supposedly post-AIDS era and "the strategic 
banalization of gay and lesbian politics" (13). In our time, I think we 
ought to consider the lateral agency of Isherwood's queer "minority-
sister" as a response to the "slow death" that marginalized subjects 
bear and represent, as Berlant claims.22 We might view the scenes 
of ascetic enjoyment in a diminished sense of self, as well as the 
enjoyment of playing impersonal roles within slightly sadomasoch-
istic intensities, as forms of "slow life," or impersonally queer lives. 
Minoritarian subjects can impersonally enjoy suspending the burden 
of selfhood, of sovereign agency, and even entertain transcending the 
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1. Summers adds, however, that these issues are "balanced and quali-
fied by a transcendent religious vision" sustained by Isherwood's 
forty-year investment in spiritual asceticism, grounded in Vedanta 
Hinduism (xiii). Many of the concepts at work in this essay—asceti-
cism, detachment, divestment of the ego—are concepts shared with 
the belief system and ritual tradition of Vedanta. Isherwood was a 
faithful disciple of Vedanta, studying under Swami Prabhavananda 
(and initially intending to become a monk) in the Pasadena-based 
Vedanta Society of Southern California, part of the Ramakrishna Or-
der in India. This Western version of Vedanta, which was introduced 
to Isherwood by his friend, noted intellectual and spiritual confidant 
Gerald Heard, promulgated the essential insignificance of the self and 
the essential equivalence of all living things. Isherwood describes 
Heard's and Prabhavanda's influence on him (referring to himself in 
the third person, which is a signature of his style) in this fashion: "As 
the result of his talks with Gerald [Heard] and Gerald's friend and 
teacher, the Hindu monk Prabhavananda, Christopher found himself 
able to believe—as a possibility, at least—that an eternal impersonal 
presence (call it 'the soul' if you like) exists within all creatures and 
is other than the mutable non-eternal 'person'" (Christopher and His 
Kind 305–06). However, I believe that Isherwood's allegiance to an 
impersonal ascetic ideal precedes and indeed fortifies his postemi-
gration dedication to Vedanta ritual and religious practice. For more 
on Isherwood's spiritual dimension, see My Guru and His Disciple.
2. Georg Simmel theorized the social "type" of the "stranger," a socio-
logical concept that describes individuals who mediate between social 
worlds given their own position as relative outsiders. The cosmopoli-
tan stranger that Isherwood best represents in the early fiction is his 
eponymous narrator, named William Bradshaw, in "The Last of Mr. 
Norris" and Christopher Isherwood in "Goodbye to Berlin" respec-
tively. In both cases, the impersonal and detached observations of 
Isherwood's reserved English narrator illustrate the insight a stranger 
has while looking into the maelstrom of political and cultural changes 
taking place in a foreign society, such as Isherwood's with regard 
to Berlin in the Weimar Era. According to Simmel, the stranger can 
view his social surroundings "objectively" because "he is not bound 
by roots to the particular constituents and partisan dispositions of 
the group" (145). Isherwood's allegiance to an aesthetic doctrine of 
impersonality and ego-divesting ascetic ideal underscores the virtues 
of the stranger as a privileged yet reserved social observer—his fa-
mous "I am a Camera" in the Berlin writings and, I argue, beyond.
3. In the typescript "First Draft" to Christopher and His Kind, for example, 
Isherwood calls E. M. Forster "a great chieftain" of the homosexual 
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"tribe" (55). As other critics can attest, the "tribe" concept is key to 
Isherwood's worldview of homosexuality as an oppressed cultural 
identity or minority, on par with socioeconomic class, since his earliest 
days in Berlin. The difference between "tribe" and "kind," however, 
is subtle: "kind" entails a solidarity with other minority groups, as 
A Single Man makes clear in the classroom scene. Thus, even in 
Christopher and His Kind, usually taken to be his gay manifesto, 
Isherwood argues for cross-identitarian (or minoritarian) solidarity. 
For a different reading on the "tribe" versus "kind" distinction, see 
Jamie Carr (2). While Carr also argues that Isherwood "resists es-
sentialized categories of identification" (2), her larger argument is 
about the anti-linear and antiprogressive sense of queer temporality 
represented in Isherwood's writings. 
4. Tim Dean's queer Lacanian work draws on modernist impersonality 
and a conception of the unconscious as the otherness within. See, for 
instance, his "T. S. Eliot, Famous Clairvoyante," where he elaborates 
a notion of the modernist poet as a medium for alien forces and 
voices, thereby evacuating the self. Dean thus draws out the queer 
implications of Eliot's modernist doctrine of impersonality. For other 
takes on modernist impersonality, see the now-classic Maud Ellman 
and the recent Sharon Cameron.
5. In Christopher and His Kind, see, for instance, Isherwood's reliance 
on the third-person "Christopher" or even "Isherwood" when speak-
ing of his past selves, which grammatically insists on the impersonal 
distance between the authorial persona and its past instantiations, 
present even in the memoir. One could say that in Christopher and His 
Kind, Isherwood mobilizes impersonal form on behalf of the politics 
of identity, a frank ideological stance missing in the purer fictional 
narratives, which eschew the entailments of identitarian political 
representation in favor of impersonality keyed to a self-divesting 
ascetic ideal.
6. Marianne DeKoven, in "Psychoanalysis and Sixties Utopianism," ar-
gues that the 1960s in the US stretched into the 1970s—what she 
calls "the long sixties" (263).
7. I am using the term "queer" in the strategically nonspecific sense 
of forms of being and belonging that are opposed to all regimes of 
normativity, as articulated by Michael Warner in the introduction to 
Fear of a Queer Planet. Warner writes against the "dominant concept" 
of "gay and lesbian community" as "a notion generated in the tactics 
of Anglo-American identity politics and its liberal-national environ-
ment": "in the liberal-pluralist frame [the notion of lesbian and gay 
community] predisposes that political demands will be treated as 
demands for the toleration and representation of a minority constitu-
ency" (xxxv–xxxvi). Isherwood's novella resists this "reduction," in 
Warner's terms, of the political model of sexual dissidence to a com-
munity model of discrete identities under a liberal umbrella. Indeed, 
A Single Man criticizes what it calls the "pseudoliberal sentimentality" 
of "tolerance," which the novel considers merely a tacit form of an-
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nihilation through social ghettoization. At the same time, the famous 
diction of "minority-sister" in the classroom scene is in tension with 
this queer impersonal and ascetic ideal.
8. I use the term "nonfictional autobiography" to stress the generic 
ambiguity of texts like Lions and Shadows. As Isherwood reminds 
us in his "Note to the reader," that book "is not, in the ordinary 
journalistic sense of the word, an autobiography . . . it is not even 
entirely 'true'" (7). Thus, Isherwood presents Lions and Shadows 
as a curious mixture of fiction and autobiography, a fictionalized, 
if not wholly fictional, autobiography, in contrast to the scrupulous 
"journalistic" adherence to facts—especially regarding his sexual-
ity—that characterizes his later Christopher and His Kind. The latter 
thus stands as a political correction of the former.
9. As I do, Joseph Bristow argues that A Single Man does not anticipate 
gay liberation, but rather is continuous with Isherwood's earlier nov-
els, which in Isherwood's and many critics' eyes "tactful[ly] silenc[ed] 
his [narrators'] gayness" (147). I agree that the novel "extends 
Isherwood's sustained interest in representing homosexuality in 
some of his earlier novels" (Bristow 147). Yet, Bristow's larger argu-
ment regards Isherwood's writings as primarily "backward-looking," 
which sidesteps Isherwood's evolution as a politically aware writer 
constantly adapting to his time and place (World War in Europe and 
the Pacific; the Cold War; Weimar, Germany; Los Angeles). It is just 
that Isherwood resisted the normative claims of politics, especially if 
these stigmatized homosexuality, but even especially if these claims 
threatened to usurp the relative autonomy of literary practice. Ish-
erwood belonged to what he termed the "cult of the Artist," or the 
modernist cult of aesthetic autonomy. See, for instance, Isherwood's 
"Unused Chapter" to Christopher and His Kind: He writes that "the 
artist stands alone" (13); and: "It was Edward Upward who had read 
Baudelaire to Christopher and who had initiated him into the cult of 
the Artist" (13). In fact, I argue against Bristow that A Single Man is 
a modernist, pre-gay liberation or impersonally queer work, whereas 
the nonfictional Christopher and His Kind documents Isherwood's 
direct advocacy for gay liberation. 
10. In 1974, Isherwood famously gave an MLA address on homosexuality 
and literature. See Berg 9–10. 
11. See especially in Intimacies Bersani's "Shame On You" 31–56 and 
"The Power of Love and the Power of Evil" 57–88. 
12. Pace Bersani, whose analysis of contemporary queer ascetic self-
divestiture focuses on unsafe sex between men (or barebacking), A 
Single Man is devoid of gay sex. While George masturbates in the 
penultimate scene of the novel—before his presumable death—the 
remainder of the narrative is oddly chaste. There are several scenes 
of George's homoerotic appreciation for male bodies, for example, but 
none that dramatize these bodies getting it on. Isherwood's ascetic 
ideal is thus evident in the novel's subtle treatment of erotic desire. 
This ascetic ideal arguably explains the narrative's sublimation of 
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sexual desires and elevation of nonsexual desires for detached or 
impersonal attachment.
13. This is how Bersani famously formulates it in "Is the Rectum a Grave?" 
for instance.
14. I have many concerns with minimizing the specificities and entail-
ments of identity, disenfranchisement, and histories of oppression that 
a queer theory of impersonality and ascetic self-vaporization, such 
as Bersani's, raise. For a sensitive treatment of the double burden 
of a queer, though not yet gay, aesthetic subjectivity, see Heather 
Love's chapter on Walter Pater in Feeling Backward.
15. The use of the term "vacation" might be emblematic of the bourgeois 
privilege attending such scenes of lateral agency. But I think misfit 
minorities also practice escaping the burden of self through ostensibly 
lateral means. 
16. In the 1930s, Isherwood termed British society and its liberal gov-
ernance a "British heterosexual dictatorship" (Unused Chapter of 
Christopher and His Kind 5). In the same section, Isherwood scorns 
the "so-called democracies" of the West, whom he saw in the 1930s 
as no better than the totalitarian states of Germany and Russian 
Soviets. He writes: "Only the anarchists of Spain would seem to have 
affirmed the homosexual's right to live" (9).
17. George sides with something called the majority and speaks of minori-
ties as the other in condescending and reductive terms. Note his use 
of the pronoun "we" to refer to an imagined majority ("Minorities are 
people . . . like us . . . It's better if we admit to disliking and hating 
them . . . " [71]). 
18. As we will see with the old married couple, the words "rage" and 
"resentment" reappear later in the novel, transformed by a perversely 
romantic discourse of impersonal attachment mediated by performa-
tive insult.
19. I borrow the term "aesthetics of existence" from the second and third 
volumes of Foucault's History of Sexuality, where the philosopher's 
study of eroticism in the West became a study not of systematic 
control over subjects and populations, but a study of ancient self-
fashioning and an ethics of care of the self (The Use of Pleasure and 
The Care of the Self).
20. Engaging in such symbolic exchanges allows for impersonal under-
standing, without the sugarcoating or "bland annihilation" that Mrs. 
Strunk practices with George (27–29). Her "incurious" tolerance 
betrays a resistance to engage with George as an other. But beyond 
allowing the dialogue to take place, the impersonality of playing a 
social role self-consciously adds a safeguard. One cannot take per-
sonally the enactment of a social role; rather, the responsibility now 
belongs to society for structuring itself along these differential lines 
to begin with. One's personal culpability fades as the determinism 
of social roles comes into sharper focus; abdicating burdensome at-
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tachment to one's cultural self pays dividends in demonstrating the 
entailments of identity formation outside an individual purview.
21. These are very retrograde desires represented here: wanting a more 
impersonal, more hierarchical, relationship. Yet, George reaches a 
rapprochement across social divides. By so doing, he ensures that the 
novel refuses to ignore these divisions (as "pseudoliberals" would) or 
to relegate them to the collective level of political rage (with resent-
ment, as in the politics of identity). The novel offers escape from the 
liberal tenet of sovereign agency and the rhetoric of identity. In what 
I read as misfit minoritarian poetics and politics, the novel stages 
scenes of self-attenuation, affective and libidinal negativity, antisocial 
detachment, and impersonal relationality as paradoxical intimacies.
22. By "slow death," Berlant indicates an ongoing ordinary experience 
that "refers to the physical wearing out of a population and the de-
terioration of people in that population that is very nearly a defining 
condition of their experience and historical existence" (754). Berlant's 
focus on "death" is dramatically political, in order to demonstrate that 
the "general emphasis of the phrase ['slow death'] is on the phe-
nomenon of mass physical attenuation under global/national regimes 
of capitalist structural subordination and governmentality" (754). 
One could say that my focus is on slow life, or the less-dramatically 
inflected phenomenon of ongoing physical and social experiences 
of marginalization, lack of access to the good life, yet perseverance 
through affective and social, not to mention aesthetic, means such 
as ritualized religion, literary and cultural invention and consump-
tion, and so on. To call such ongoing experiences of limited pleasure, 
limited transcendence of social and political marginalization "slow 
death" is in some ways to minimize the creative potential for any 
individual or "population," to use Berlant's term, to enact resistance, 
however fleeting or weak, to regimes of domination. For a different 
conception of nonsovereign or suspended agency, see Sianne Ngai. 
For a classic example of the possibility of cultural vibrancy despite 
systematic oppression, see Patterson on African American antebel-
lum cultures under slavery, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative 
Study. Like Berlant's emphasis on slow death, Patterson's focus on 
social death takes into account the potential for limited agency among 
the oppressed despite such morbidly repressive conditions. Such 
agency bespeaks a form of optimism that might qualify as cruel, in 
Berlant's terms. However, such optimism can also be read as a mode 
of affirmation. See Michael Snediker for more on queer optimism. 
Also see Heather Love for a touching reminder of the importance of 
attending to negative affects and queer structures of feeling.
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